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ABSTRACT: Mark Dsouza’s new book, Rationale-Based Defences in Criminal Law, aims to 
shed new light on the question of how to conceptualize justifications and excuses as 
defenses against criminal liability this debate. His offers an alternative to the common 
account on which justifications negate the wrongness of acts whereas excuses negate 
only the actor’s blameworthiness but not the act’s wrongness. Instead, Dsouza contends 
that the justification-excuse distinction is entirely a matter of the quality of the 
defendant’s reasoning. His account of justifications is generally compelling, although his 
accounts of excuses and of the moral norms underlying the criminal law are less 
persuasive. Overall, however, Dsouza successfully establishes his quality-of-reasoning 
view as a viable competitor theory of justifications and excuses. 
 
 
The question of how to conceptualize justifications and excuses as defenses 
against criminal liability is a topic that, despite extensive philosophical attention, 
continues to be among the most contentious issues in normative criminal law theory. 
Mark Dsouza’s new book, Rationale-Based Defences in Criminal Law, aims to shed new 
light on this debate. This is an impressive piece of work: it is carefully reasoned, 
responsive to existing debates in criminal law theory, and always mindful of the 
practical implications of the theoretical claims it defends. 
Dsouza’s central target is what he calls the “wrongness hypothesis,” a prominent 
view on which the key distinction between justifications and excuses is that 
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justifications negate the wrongness of an offense, whereas excuses negate the agent’s 
blameworthiness for the offense but not the wrongness of the offense itself.  As the 
Model Penal Code puts it, “To say that someone’s conduct is ‘justified’ ordinarily 
connotes that the conduct is thought to be right, or at least not undesirable,” whereas 
“to say that someone’s conduct is ‘excused’ ordinarily connotes that the conduct is 
thought to be undesirable but that for some reason the actor is not to be blamed for it.”1 
Contrary to the wrongness hypothesis, Dsouza contends that we should 
distinguish the justification of acts from the justification of actors, and that we should 
acknowledge that actors may be justified, and thus blameless, in committing acts that 
are themselves wrong. If so, then the distinction between justifications and excuses 
cannot be that excuses negate a person’s blameworthiness even though the act itself 
was wrong (after all, justifications may function the same way). Thus, we need a 
different way of distinguishing justifications from excuses. 
On Dsouza’s alternative account, the distinction is entirely a matter of the quality 
of the defendant’s reasoning. On his view, the criminal law is grounded on a system of 
underlying moral norms — what he calls a “conduct rule system.” Importantly, this 
system of moral norms “operates independently of the doctrinal law designed by 
different jurisdictions to capture its content” (p. 14). This opens the possibility that a 
person may violate a criminal law but for reasons that accord with the underlying 
system of moral norms. Such a person would be justified in her behavior. For example, 
someone who shoots and kills a person because she believes the person is threatening 
her life could be justified insofar as her reasons conform to underlying moral norms 
allowing for acts of self-defense. 
                                        
1 Model Penal Code Commentaries Article 3, introduction, at 3. 
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In other cases, however, a person’s reasons for violating a law may not accord 
with these underlying norms, but she may still be excused if her reasons comport with 
society’s normative expectations (which are not exhausted by the moral norms 
underlying the criminal law). Dsouza writes, “if society would normatively expect one of 
its members to respond to a situation in the same manner as the defendant did, then it 
would be hypocritical for it to use its criminal law to single out the defendant as being 
especially deserving of blame” (p. 177). In other words, whereas the question of 
justification is whether a defendant’s reasons comport with the moral norms underlying 
the criminal law, the question of excuse is whether society has standing to condemn the 
defendant’s reasoning, or whether instead this condemnation would be hypocritical. 
His account is most clearly distinguished from theories based on the wrongness 
hypothesis in cases where either a person commits acts that he sincerely believes to be 
permissible but that are in fact wrongful, or a person commits acts that, unbeknownst to 
him, are not wrongful. As an example of the first type, Dsouza discusses the ca se of a 
police officer who shoots and kills an unarmed victim based on a genuine , albeit 
mistaken, belief that the person was armed and posed a danger to his own life (p. 98). In 
such a case, he contends that the officer is not merely excused (as the wrong ness 
hypothesis would imply) but actually justified, insofar as the officer, based on his 
sincere but mistaken assessment of the situation, acted for reasons that comport with 
the moral norms underlying the criminal law: in this case, the right to act in self-
defense. 
As an example of the second type, Dsouza discusses the case of R v. Dadson,2 in 
which a constable shot and injured a thief trying to escape with wood from a copse (p. 
96). The thief had two previous misdemeanor convictions for the same offense , and this 
                                        
2 R. v. Dadson (1850) 4 Cox CC 358. 
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third offense constituted a felony under English law. The law permitted a constable to 
shoot to prevent the commission of a felony, but not to prevent the commission of a 
misdemeanor. The constable had not known, when he shot the thief, that this was the 
third offense and thus a felony. Therefore, although he had in fact acted permissibly, he 
had not known at the time about the facts that made his act permissible. The wrongness 
hypothesis implies that the constable was justified, in that his conduct was not itself 
wrongful. The court ruled, however, that the constable was not entitled to a justification 
defense. Dsouza agrees with the court’s ruling and contends that his quality-of-
reasoning view can explain why the court’s decision was appropriate. He writes: 
The mere circumstance of fortuitously having acted so as to find oneself in 
compliance with a justificatory conduct norm … should not entitle the 
agent to a justificatory defence. Instead, in order to be entitled to a 
justificatory defence, the agent should have been motivated by a 
permissive conduct norm drawn from the system of norms underlying the 
criminal law. (p. 96) 
Central to Dsouza’s account, as these examples illustrate, is his view that a 
person can do the wrong thing but for the right reasons, or vice versa, and that 
whether she is justified is a matter of the rightness of her reasons, not the 
rightness of her actions. There is much to be said in favor of this sort of view, and 
indeed, Dsouza acknowledges that others have rejected the wrongness 
hypothesis on similar grounds.3 In what follows, however, I focus on two 
distinctive aspects of Dsouza’s book, and raise concerns relating to each. 
First, the book is ambitious in that it attempts to articulate and defend an 
account of the system of moral norms underlying the criminal law. This account 
is not strictly speaking necessary to Dsouza’s central thesis. That is, his claim that 
a person is justified in her conduct if her reasoning comports with the system of 
                                        
3 See, notably, Marcia Baron, “Justifications and Excuses,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2005): 
387–406. 
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moral norms underlying the criminal law could be true even if he is wrong about 
the content or derivation of these underlying norms. Nevertheless, Dsouza offers 
an extended discussion of these norms, in part because he wants to show that his 
account of justifications generates intuitively plausible results in particular 
cases, and to do this he must flesh out the norms with which justified reasoning 
accords. 
At the heart of Dsouza’s account of the moral norms underlying the criminal law 
are what he calls “constituent rights.” These are rights that correspond to constituent 
features of typical human beings. (He supplements this with an account of “posited 
rights,” though I won’t have space to discuss these here.) In particular, he follows 
Hobbes in citing self-preservation as a constituently human behavior and follows Hegel 
in citing as constituently human the recognition of other human beings as more than 
mere instruments to be used for our purposes (pp. 50–53). Dsouza contends that these 
constituent features are not susceptible to moral praise or blame (any more than having 
opposable thumbs is susceptible to moral assessment). These features do ground 
certain constituent rights, however, such as the right to life and the right not to be used 
as a mere means. Helping to protect these constituent rights is a central function of the 
criminal law. In some instances, however, a person may violate a criminal law but for 
reasons that comport with these constituent rights. Consider the example mentioned 
above, in which a police officer, under the mistaken belief that an unarmed person is in 
fact armed and threatening him, is driven by a desire for self-preservation to kill the 
person. Dsouza regards such cases as paradigmatic instances of justification. 
The strategy of drawing on constituent features of human beings to ground a 
system of underlying moral norms thus does a lot of work in Dsouza’s account. I am 
skeptical about this line of argument, however, for a few reasons. First, he equivocates 
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about the nature of these constituent human elements that are not susceptible to moral 
praise or blame: are they capacities or behaviors? In elaborating the view, he writes by 
analogy that it makes no sense to ask whether it is moral for us “to have opposable 
thumbs, or to be capable of walking on two feet, or to be able to choose our willed 
actions” (p. 51). This suggests that constituently human capacities are not susceptible to 
moral assessment. Then he writes, however, that it similarly “makes no sense to ask  
whether it is moral for a human to have behaved in a manner that was constituently 
human, even when doing so harms others” (ibid.). This suggests that it is not merely 
capacities but behaviors that can be immune to moral evaluation. His discussion in what 
follows indicates that he is more interested in constituently human behaviors than 
capacities. If this is correct, then his appeal to opposable thumbs, the capacity to walk 
on two feet, or the capacity to choose willed actions as illustrations is misleading. For 
although merely having opposable thumbs, being a biped, or being capable of rational 
choice falls outside the scope of moral evaluation, behaviors that issue from these 
features — using our thumbs to pull the trigger on a gun, stepping on an injured person 
in our path, or exercising our capacity for choice in various heinous ways — certainly 
are susceptible to moral evaluation. 
Suppose, though, that having opposable thumbs and being bipeds are just ill-
chosen analogies, and that Dsouza is centrally interested in constituently human 
behaviors. We must then ask what behaviors count as constituently human. My second 
reason for skepticism about this line of argument is that he devotes surprisingly  little 
space to fleshing out these constituent behaviors. It’s true, as Dsouza points out, that 
providing a full account of all such behaviors would be too big a project to tackle in this 
book. But his discussion is essentially limited to the two behaviors noted above: self-
preservation and recognition of others’ humanity. What about other, less palatable 
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behaviors, such as weak-willed, greedy, envious, or selfish behaviors? Are these not 
constituent behaviors of human beings? If not, why not? They are certainly widely 
manifested by human beings. Arguably selfishness is at least as prevalent in human 
beings as the recognition of others as not merely instrumental. We might understand 
the constituent behaviors as those that are distinctively human, but then self-
preservation behavior would be ruled out, as nonhuman animals exhibit survival 
instincts. 
Dsouza makes clear that he does not take the constituent human behaviors he 
discusses to constitute an exhaustive list, so perhaps weak-willed, greedy, and other 
such behaviors would also be included on a comprehensive list. But if so, it follows on 
his account that such behaviors are logically prior to any system of moral norms, and 
thus (like self-preservation) are not subject to the blame conveyed by criminal 
sanctions. This is presumably a result he would find unacceptable. 
Dsouza does tell us that constituently human behaviors may conflict, so that a 
given action may manifest one constituent behavior (say, self-preservation) and 
contradict another (say, recognition of others as not merely instrumental). He contends 
that, in such cases, these actions become susceptible to moral assessment. Perhaps, 
then, he could admit that greedy or selfish behaviors are constituently human, but then 
insist that actions issuing from these behaviors typically contradict other constitue ntly 
human behaviors. In such cases, actions emerging from greedy or selfish behaviors 
would be susceptible to moral evaluation. But if this is his view, he must make clear why 
an act that manifests a conflict between constituent human behaviors  — neither of 
which is itself susceptible to moral assessment — is thus susceptible to such 
assessment. Why not say instead that, when behaviors are not morally assessable, 
conflicts issuing from these behaviors are similarly not morally assessable? 
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Suppose we accept, however, that when actions manifest one constituent 
behavior but contradict another, the actions are themselves susceptible to moral 
assessment. So, in the example Dsouza discusses, actions motivated by self -preservation 
are not subject to moral evaluation unless they fail to recognize the humanity of others 
and treat them merely as tools. Notice, though (and this is my third reason for 
skepticism about his line of argument), that determining whether an action fails to 
respect others’ humanity itself involves moral assessment. Thus, it is not quite true, as 
Dsouza claims, that actions issuing from constituent human behaviors are not 
susceptible to moral assessment unless they contradict other constituent human 
behaviors. Rather, all actions are susceptible to moral assessment to determine whether 
they conflict with other constituent behaviors. 
Ultimately, I am not persuaded that Dsouza provides an intuitively appealing 
basis for deriving constituent rights. As I said, though, his central claim about 
justifications — namely, that one is justified in acting when one’s reasons comport with 
the system of moral norms underlying the criminal justice system — does not depend 
on the particular derivation of these norms that he endorses. In my view, his rationale-
based account of justifications and his rejection of the wrongness hypothesis are 
persuasive in their own right, regardless of my reservations about his derivation of the 
underlying norms. 
The second distinctive aspect of Dsouza’s account that I want to discuss is his 
analysis of excuses. As we have seen, a person is justified, on Dsouza’s account, when 
her reasons for acting accord with the system of moral norms underlying the criminal 
law. She is excused when, although her reasons do not comport with these underlying 
norms, it would be hypocritical for society to blame her, because she has done what 
society would normatively expect of any of its members in the given circumstances. I 
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think the gist of this account of excuses is plausible, but I do not think hypocrisy is the 
most useful way to characterize what is wrong with failing to excuse in such 
circumstances. Hypocrisy suggests that A holds B to a standard, or blames B for failing 
to meet a standard, that A himself fails to meet. For a society’s failure to excuse a 
person’s conduct to constitute hypocrisy, then, it must be the case that society holds the 
person to a standard to which it does not hold its members generally. 
Now consider the commonly cited excuse of duress. We tend to think that 
committing crimes when under threat from another person is at least sometimes less 
blameworthy (or even blameless) insofar as it would be expecting too much of the agent 
to resist the threat. But notice that, although blaming in such cases may be 
unreasonable, it need not be hypocritical. If society consistently blames people who 
commit crimes under duress, then it is not holding some to a standard to which it does 
not hold others. The appropriate criticism of such a practice would be, instead, that 
society’s treatment of its members reflects that its expectations are consistently too 
high. 
Despite my reservations about Dsouza’s derivation of the constituent rights 
underlying the criminal law, or his casting of excuses in terms of avoiding hypocrisy, I 
believe that his central line of argument — that the distinction between justifications 
and excuses hinges on the quality of the defendant’s reasoning  — is persuasive. 
Although others have endorsed a similar basis for the distinction, and thus have 
similarly rejected the wrongness hypothesis, Dsouza’s extended defense of this view 
presents an important contribution to the ongoing debate on this thorny issue. 
Earlier, I wrote that the book is ambitious in attempting to lay out the system of 
moral norms underlying the criminal law. It is in another respect modest. Dsouza 
acknowledges that he does not take himself to be providing a decisive line of argument 
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for his view, or against the wrongness hypothesis, which he describes as “eminently 
plausible” (p. xvii). Indeed, he concludes, “I doubt that it is possible to provide any such 
proof. However, I hope that it does supply strong reasons to believe that the quality of 
reasoning-based model described here is a very good description of how the criminal 
law should be, because it is plausible, well founded and gives rise to desirable 
outcomes” (p. 179). In my view, Dsouza largely succeeds in establishing his quality-of-
reasoning view as a viable competitor theory. 
